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INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS ON DEVELOPING POLITICAL CAPABILITIES:
THE CASE OF EUROPEAN AIRLINES ON THE AFTERMATH OF 9/11
ABSTRACT
Governments and their agents can both facilitate and constrain organizational wealth
creation. Whilst heterogeneously distributed valuable political resources allow a firm to
develop capabilities to gain competitive advantage, less attention has been devoted to the
conditions that impact the development of political capabilities in varying institutional
contexts. This qualitative, inductive study examines the development and application of
political capabilities in five European national airline carriers within an institutional
context requiring reactive political strategies to influence policy makers, i.e. avoiding
security costs from 9/11. We contribute to capability theory and practice studies by
showing how senior management teams develop political capabilities in institutional
contexts exhibiting increased uncertainty. We argue that while the senior management’s
attention to specific political processes can create valuable political capabilities, this
value creation is moderated by the nature of the institutional environment and its barriers.
Keywords: airline industry; institutions; political capabilities; process; strategy-as-
practice.
2The core challenge for strategic leaders is to create or sustain a competitive advantage.
Government practices affects the competitive advantage of firms and industries and can
increase or decrease profitability. As a discipline, strategic management has offered a
variety of theoretical routes to meet this challenge (Mahoney and Pandian 1992;
Cockburn et al., 2000; Sirmon et al., 2007). The organizational capability approach,
embedded in the context of a resource-based perspective, has become a primary
explanatory framework of competitive advantage (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997;
Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Zollo and Winter 2002; Helfat and Peteraf 2003; Ethiraj et
al., 2005). It explicitly focuses on conditions of market environment change (Eisenhardt
and Martin 2000) and non-market environment change (McWlliams et al., 2002; Baron
2001; Bonardi et al., 2007).
Teece et al. originally defined capabilities as the ability of firms to integrate, build
and reconfigure resources to sustain competitive advantage in rapidly changing
environments (1997, p. 510). However, the organizational capabilities perspective
encountered criticism for being theoretically ambiguous. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000)
addressed the criticisms, by proposing that dynamic capabilities consist of specific
identifiable strategic and organizational processes, i.e. product development, alliances
and strategic decision making that create value for firms within dynamic markets by
manipulating resources into new value-creating strategies. In this context, questions
specifically about the capabilities required by managers within the strategy process have
been raised by scholars adopting the strategy-as-practice perspective.
Our study examines the development of a political capability as a strategic
capability in a changing institutional context (Lawton and Rajwani, 2011; Lawton et al
32012). Political capabilities are an important means by which firm’s appropriate value by
influencing policy that will positively affect their market position (Hillman and Hitt
1999). In this paper we show how the institutional context impacted and interacted with
the European flag carrier airlines to develop their political capabilities in a reactive
approach (the introduction of the security costs from 9/11) from 2001-2004. Therefore,
stemming from organizational capability theory and institutional theory, we argue that
political capabilities are a set of specific and identifiable strategic and operational
processes that are used by firms to gain and sustain advantage in the non-market
environment, in our case the corporate political environment. Our distinctive theoretical
position draws attention on how the institutional characteristics determine the ways in
which firms use political capabilities to obtain, integrate, reconfigure, and release
political resources. Therefore the main purpose of our study is to examine “what”
institutional factors shape and constrain the political capability development process.
Our study asks what it takes for airlines to develop their political capabilities to capture
value within a specific institutional environment. Our findings contribute to
organizational capability research, and more broadly the strategy-as-practice field, by
revealing the mechanisms through which political capability emerges in a reactive
institutional context.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: CAPABILITIES AND INSTITUTIONS
Corporate Political Activity (CPA) and Institutional Environment
Whereas market strategies involve decisions such as product positioning and pricing,
non-market strategies are actions taken by the firm in its political, regulatory, and social
environments for the purpose of increasing firm value (Baron, 1995, 1997). Corporate
political behavior includes such activities as lobbying a legislator or regulator, litigating a
4case in court, making campaign contributions, and mobilizing political actors to support
or oppose a strategic initiative. There are two fundamental questions associated with
crafting corporate political strategy: first, “how do institutions” impact the non-market
activity of a firm; and second, how do political capabilities develop within a specific
industry to impact the non-market environment. These questions are important as they
relate to both firm strategy and the boundaries of the firm. We apply these questions to
the corporate political activity (CPA) undertaken by airlines at the European Commission
and EU national government level after 9/11.
The notion of CPA and its value to firms in managing the institutional
environment both nationally and internationally is acknowledged in the literature
(Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Keillor and Hult, 2004; Bonardi et al., 2006). Keillor et al.,
(2005) suggest that firms involved in political strategy have several motives for engaging
in political behavior. First, domain advantage (pursuing the firm’s private interests);
second, domain defense (managing public policy that might be at odds with the firm’s
strategic goals); and third, domain maintenance (influencing public policy that might
threaten the means by which a firm achieves it goals). A variety of political behaviors can
be used to accomplish the firm’s overall objective of dealing with political uncertainty.
These include business-government alliances, political inducements and contributions
and, in this study, overt political strategy.
Existing research on CPA tends to focus on the amount and type of influence that
occurs when political capabilities are exercised and has largely omitted the options firms
have to organize their political capabilities, i.e. the process of lobbying from a corporate
perspective. As a result, the collective action literature has much to say about the amount
of political strategies that occur but is less informative when it comes to the organization
5of and processes of emergence of political capabilities (Hillman et al., 1999).
Furthermore, the theories articulating the free-rider problem do not address whether firms
will choose to internalize the political action function or undertake it through a common
body outside their organizations. The main criticisms of the studies are that they fail to
understand how institutions participate in developing these political capabilities,
especially by understanding the key patterns of development internally and externally.
Developing Political Capabilities in Reactive Institutional Contexts
Different authors coming from disparate scholarly traditions have used the term
institution in so many ways that it is not clear what it means unless defined precisely for
the context of a study. Within this vast literature, North’s book (1990) and Scott’s (1995)
works are by far the most recognized references and provide the most widely accepted
notions of institutions. Institutions, as explained by North and Scott, include both formal
constraints, such as legal regimes and the way they are enforced, and informal
constraints, such as widely held norms and codes of conduct. Both North and Scott
explicitly contend that institutions are “the basic rules of the game” that structure the
economic, political, and social relationships (see also Fligstein, 2001). The nature of
those institutions vary from more formal –e.g., regulation and the quality of judiciary– to
more informal –e.g., embedded, local practices and beliefs that define “how things are
done here” (ibid. 2001). The commonality among those different institutions is that they
control the way firms behave and the way resources retain or lose value (Powell and
DiMaggio, 1991).
Capability literature within the strategic management domain (Thomas, 2001)
offers very little about overcoming institutional barriers. Existing literature on institutions
6asserts that there are very limited possibilities of institutional incremental change
(Eggertsson, 2005; North, 1990). An important lesson from developing economies and
remarkably from processes of marketization across Europe is that institutional change, is
that evolution and change in institutions is too slow and sluggish, the path to improve
supporting institutions is very unclear, and experimental in nature. As a corollary,
significant manipulation of institutions is likely to be beyond one or several firms’ power
and ability (Eggertsson, 2005). Next we show how a practice perspective can advance our
understanding of capability development.
A Practice Perspective on Capability Development in Reactive Institutional
Contexts
Despite the abovementioned advancements in our understanding of the impact of
institutional context in the principal features of capabilities and the capability
development process, we are still missing micro-level examinations of such processes.
Questions specifically about the capabilities required at the micro-level and by managers
within the strategy process have been raised by scholars adopting the strategy-as-practice
perspective. Notably, Whittington argues that a central question for researchers is “what
are the skills required for strategizing and organizing work and how are they acquired?”
(2003, p. 120). Interestingly, while the strategy-as-practice approach allows for such
micro-level examinations of practice due to the constructs and practice theories available
to practice researchers (Vaara and Whittington, 2012), there is a lack of empirical,
practice studies focusing on practitioners’ capabilities. We argue that this is an area of
great potential in both theoretical and empirical terms, as captured in Table 1 below. This
table outlines the key questions, constructs and features of a strategy-as-practice
7perspective into the study of political capabilities in an emergent institutional context.
This table also serves to contrast this practice-based approach to traditional ways for the
study of political capabilities found in the strategy literature.
---------------------------------
Insert Table 1 about here
---------------------------------
The purpose of the present study, therefore, was to build theory about how
practitioners develop political capabilities in the context of an emergent institutional
reality. Without such an understanding strategy researchers lack insights into the
determinants of macro-level capability development patterns and the environmental-level
changes that have received the majority of attention by previous studies in the capability
literature. Given this gap in the literature and rising calls for such micro-level work at the
intersections of strategy-as-practice (Johnson et al., 2003; Whittington, 2006) and
institutional theory fields (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Lounsbury, 2008; Jarzabkowski
et al., 2009), we set out to examine how practitioners in the airline industry developed
political capabilities in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States of
America. There are theoretical and empirical benefits from such study. At a theoretical
level, and as shown in table 1, below, we argue that practice-oriented examinations of
political capability development can help us address new and important questions, not
traditionally addressed in the strategy literature. at the empirical level, and following
empirical studies at the intersections of institutional theory and strategy-as-practice
(Dacin, Munir, and Tracey, 2010; Paroutis and Heracleous, 2013; Tilcsik, 2010), our
study contributes to a micro-level understanding of political capability development by
airline practitioners in the emergent institutional context at the aftermath of 9/11. Overall,
our principle research question is: What moderating factors contribute to the development
8of political capabilities in reactive institutional contexts?
METHOD
Research Setting: Airlines in the Aftermath of 9/11
Consideration of the institutional contexts in the non-market environment is important to
analyze the way political capabilities are organized, since different contexts imply
different valuations of resources and capabilities (Penrose, 1959). However, little work
has been done to assess the effects of firm-specific political capabilities on helping the
firm manage its resources in a given institutional context (Ethiraj et al., 2005). Although
firms in any given industry are likely to face similar types of institutional forces, the
differences in their accumulated political resources and political capability endowments
(e.g. skills, propensity for learning, specialized assets) could become important factors
that may influence the development of sources of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991).
We define the institutional context as a frame where firms, individually or collectively,
have an expected understanding of systemic stakeholder actors within a political system.
As a result, the firm responds reactively to advance or defend its interests in an
exogenous period.
Our context is the “9/11”, which is viewed as a period of high costs that
constitutes the effects of terrorism. The terrorist attacks in the USA caused a number of
short and medium term impacts on the European aviation industry. First of all, US
airspace was closed in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, and was not opened for
four days. During this period, no flights from Europe to the USA could operate, leading
to a loss of revenue for airlines and airports in Europe. When flights resumed, there was a
dramatic decrease in demand. This was most severe on North Atlantic routes but was
significant across all types of routes. The only market segment that did not appear to be
9badly hit was the low fares sector. It seemed that demand from consumers for low fares
still kept them on a healthy and strong foothold in this period. On the commercial side,
the airline industry response to the crisis facing them post September 11 was centered on
withdrawing aircraft from service, cutting staff numbers and renegotiating contracts with
suppliers. In the months following September 11, the European Union’s surviving flag
carriers announced job cuts of circa 25,000 employees. Air France and Finnair were
notable as the only major carriers who did not announce job losses. In addition, there
were also a number of actions taken to maximize cash reserves, such as deferring
investments and sale of non-core businesses.
In this challenging context, airline executives knew that they were losing demand,
so they had to find ways to get compensated on the aftermath of the attacks. In order to
secure compensation to support their growing debts, exacerbated by a fall in demand and
extra costs associated with new government security policies, airlines had to react
quickly. It was within this environment that European airlines quickly learned that they
had to lobby the European Commission and their national governments, as lobbying was
vital to them sustaining their competitive positions. Moreover, the majority of airline
government affairs departments had to influence and make their organization’s interests
heard on several issues. Figure 1 below showcases the levels (national, firm and
international) of stakeholders involved in the aftermath of 9/11 and were the focus of our
study. In each firm, we paid particular attention on the political capabilities and lobbying
practices employed by the “government affair office”, which tends to be comprised by a
small number of executives whose role to lobby government officials and interact with
other relevant stakeholders.
Overall, in the challenging and emergent institutional context shaped by the
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aftermath of 9/11, airline executives started more actively to explore and develop
political capabilities that were, in turn, expected to help them be successful in getting
their firm’s issues heard and addressed. Such setting was ideally suitable for our study of
political capability development in an emergent institutional context.
---------------------------------
Insert Figure 1 about here
---------------------------------
Case Studies
We followed the guidelines of case selection for theory building from case studies
provided by Yin (2003) and Eisenhardt (1989). The selection of the case sites was based
on theoretical sampling, necessary so that the phenomenon of interest can be readily
observed. In the European airline industry we identified several firms that met our initial
criteria of being a fully functioning business in the chosen policy context, including firms
that: (a) had some amount of history (i.e. were not recent start-ups); and (b) had made
statements in press releases or the media that they were in the process of reconfiguring
some important aspect of their political strategies during the chosen policy context. We
contacted twenty EU-based long haul airlines and selected for the study the five firms
that committed to participate through granting us good access to their people and
documentation. In particular, these case companies granted us access to members of top
management teams within their government affairs offices or related departments that
dealt with government and regulatory agencies. All participating firms expressed an
interest in the potential findings of the study, which ensured a high degree of cooperation
during the interviewing process. Conveniently, the five case companies selected represent
a diversity of European airline companies in terms of size, ownership structure, market
success, geographical base and route network.
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We selected the airline industry – specifically European flag carrier airlines - as a
setting for our investigation for several reasons. First, air travel remains a large and
continuously expanding industry. It facilitates economic growth, world trade,
international investment and tourism and is therefore central to the globalization
phenomenon. Second, the airline industry has been fraught with politics and
governmental interference for many decades and airlines have had to battle with the
politics of regulation and deregulation, both domestically and internationally. The five
case companies included in this study are: SAS, Alitalia, TAP Air Portugal, Lufthansa,
and KLM (refer to table 2 below).
---------------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here
---------------------------------
Data Collection
We collected two types of data: semi-structured interviews and extensive archival data,
over a period of four years. Initially, we performed a pilot study consisting of in-depth,
semi-structured interviews with three directors and one manager of government affairs
from Virgin Atlantic and Swiss Air. The purpose of these interviews was to ascertain
some key constructs to refine the questionnaire used for subsequent interviews. These
experts helped to define some initial themes around political capability development –
especially with regards to the process with institutional factors– employed by airlines
with different structures. These initial themes were further refined and developed with
our main study dataset.
We gained access to five airlines where we performed 42 semi-structured
interviews between 2003-2007, ranging in duration from one to two hours. All interviews
were recorded and transcribed. We interviewed various stakeholders in order to provide a
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rounded appreciation of the phenomenon under examination. For example, our
informants had roles such as: directors of government, aeropolitical affair and public
affairs managers, public relations experts, as well as other members of the top
management team in the next level of the hierarchy who were responsible for the areas
targeted for organizing political capabilities during the chosen policy context. We also
interviewed external experts from the Association of European Airlines (AEA) and the
International Air Transport Association (IATA) to increase the validity and reliability of
our dataset. Our second dataset consisted of extensive secondary archival data sources
spanning a 10 year period (from 1997 to 2007). These included public documents,
company reports, newspaper articles, press releases and accounts in specialist airline
books and periodicals. We paid particular attention in the way features of these archival
data changed in the aftermath of 9/11 and the emergence of new publications to address
the issues the airline industry was then facing, particularly around the central issue of
security. These archival documents allowed us to contextualize and compare the themes
emerging from our interviews across the five case studies.
Data Analysis
As is typical for multiple-case, inductive research methodologies (Eisenhardt, 1989a) we
commenced data analysis by synthesizing all the interview data and the secondary data of
a focal firm and building individual case histories. We began with an in-depth analysis of
each case through the lens of our research question: What moderating factors develop
political capabilities in emerging reactive institutional contexts? We constructed a
timeline of key events and developed a comprehensive understanding of the overall case
by reading and coding all interviews and documents. Given the large number of public
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documents, company reports, newspaper articles, press releases, we used a parsimonious
list of general codes (“actions”, “relationships”, “structure” and “strategy”) and company
interviews to understand how political capabilities were developed during the period
from 2001 to 2004 at a national and a European level to explore their political strategies
to impact the deregulation process. This perspective allowed us to explore the changes
and cycles that occurred in multiple levels of organizing. We employed a multi-case
design that supported replication logic, whereby a set of cases was treated as a series of
experiments, each serving to confirm or disconfirm a set of observations (Yin, 2003). The
primary unit of analysis was the political capability. For each initiative we identified the
motivation behind the decisions. We cross-checked these descriptions across informants
to enhance validity. We looked for both commonalities in management actions in the
organizing of political capabilities across initiatives and for the overall pattern.
After completing the case analysis, we began developing a preliminary conceptual
framework by comparing the patterns of organizing political capabilities across the five
firms studied. Once the framework was developed, we applied it to all five cases to
examine how well it fit with the data (ibid. 2003). We also contacted the case study firms
with requests to review our findings and provide comments on the emerging framework.
Such procedures helped to establish the validity of results derived from the qualitative
analysis.
Using the data analysis procedure outlined above, we developed a set of formally
stated observations based on our five case studies. This constant iteration between theory
and data helped us: sharpen constructs, strengthen the internal validity of findings and
enable more frequent comparison of emergent theory with concepts and constructs from
the extant literature. The technique of cross-case pattern sequencing (Miles and
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Huberman, 1994) was used to construct an interpretive framework for organizing
political capabilities. The next section presents our findings and our conceptual
framework.
FINDINGS
The results of our inductive analysis of our dual dataset revealed six stages of importance
in the development of political capability across the five case study airlines experiencing
the aftermath of 9/11. Below, and for each of our case studies we use outline detailed
insights into the political capabilities and their employment by the government affairs
offices to deal with the new institutional context post-9/11.
Case Study 1: KLM
The harsh impact of post 9/11 was hard for the airline industry to absorb. The
government affairs office in each of our five cases had to drastically re-focus its function,
resources and capabilities to meet the new policy environmental needs brought forward
by the exogenous shock. KLM introduced a corporate political strategy, to defend their
commercial position; KLM’s government affairs office followed a strategy by lobbying
specific targets to regain a loss in revenue. It implemented this by attempting to exert
influence by means of both generic and idiosyncratic exchanges of ideas with prominent
figures in politics and the governments, and with representatives from various other
sections in Netherlands, in the days after 9/11. As one respondent said:
Few hours after the planes went into the twin towers, we had to call our
emergency director meeting and then a departmental meeting. From this meeting,
we knew that we had to meet with some senior national level authorities to give
them our position. These meetings with national authorities actually happened the
following day.
KLM’s political capabilities were developed to deal with the three issues depicted above,
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insurance coverage, aviation security costs and compensation package began very
quickly. The days after 9/11 included periodic meetings with members of the KLM
board, exchanges of correspondence on suggestions and positions taken up, organization
of industrial visits, presentations, and so on. As a senior respondent explains:
Well it was chaos that we saw all over the world after those events. There were a
couple of things that were important for us. We had to get our air craft with
passengers back into the transatlantic domain, you know that the US sealed of
their Air Space completely. So we had a lot of planes that had to fly to Canada,
Greenland, Denmark, Mexico etc. So we had a lot of issues with the Dutch
Government but also in Brussels and Washington. To get clearance to have the
international transatlantic traffic flowing again.
There were lots of different tools and methods found to be used by KLM’s government
affairs office in the aftermath of 9/11. These activities were used to influence both
national and international political targets in the hours and days after September 11. As
one KLM senior management respondent captured the essence of what was happening in
this context:
We have all sorts of templates that we follow with the addition of our own
templates. Our manuals have most answers to all possible scenarios. To be honest
we have a very extensive emergency response manual here at KLM. That is not so
much during 9/11. But I must admit that it has been sharpened up to say that after
9/11 but we have always had one. Actually I would say for decades, KLM has an
emergency department which deals with further sophisticated guidelines.
Another respondent mentioned that:
What we do in KLM is that we are easy going in giving presentations. We are
inclined to do that quite easily generally because we think that we have a message
to send and tell. We are very willing to tell that message during conferences and
lectures etc. And that is very much in the informal circuit, but still I mean I myself
quite frequently give presentations at conferences. It might be an informal way of
lobbying but it is a strong way to get your message across but there is always
press around, there are always regulators around, there are always consultants and
lawyers around, colleagues from other airlines and airports etc. So you do have
the right setting of audience to be able to get your message across. We tend to do
that regularly and most of the other lobbying is done through personal contact.
16
According to people interviewed, from the archival data obtained and EU commission
reports, KLM used mainly individual lobbying practices in the days after 9/11. However
they shifted their lobbying efforts to move through AEA and the Dutch Authorities after a
few weeks. The respondents acknowledged the fact that their political capability was very
important in developing their lobbying capability process in new institutional
environment. Moreover, senior management believed that their lobbying capability
development process would start from their political resources. The senior management,
would weigh the options of introducing new political resources or using current ones, to
make new lobbying processes that would leverage and deploy the political resources (a
symbiotic relationship between resource and capability).
Furthermore KLM senior management explained that their thinking templates led
them to believe that political resources were still comprised of human resources,
organizational structure and network resources. They believed that these sub-level
political resources needed to be reconfigured to create non-market change to impact the
potential onset of new polices. We categorized all the themes found into three key
variables that make up a political resource; human, organizational and network resources.
One of the respondents believed that it was important to leverage on these resources and
to get involved in the lobbying process early. Thereafter talking to high status people was
viewed initially as the right way in this context:
I believe that we followed the emergency manual from the first minutes and hours
after 9/11. With the addition of our own thinking of course. We were speaking to
specific targets in our national governments as explained in the manual; however
who to contact with regards to names was discussed in our emergency meetings.
At the same time, we were using AEA, but afterwards we realized that we had to
shift our efforts more at the EU level. At this stage we felt that AEA was the best
way to influence in order to get the best outcome. Individual efforts were not
needed as much after a few weeks and we thought it was a waste of time.
Everyone was in the same boat, and we had the same interests so AEA played a
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paramount role for us in this context. But we did lobby within our AEA meetings
too.
Overall, the KLM senior management team also expected that their previous experiences,
foresight, current learning, ownership and time played important roles in configuring
their political capabilities to suit more closely the new requirements in the aftermath of
9/11.
Case Study 2: Lufthansa
The government affairs function within Lufthansa was perceived by the rest of the
organization as if “they were strategic advisors”, as well as people who are in charge with
implementing strategy of Lufthansa, or, at least, creating or influencing the creation of
the political and regulatory parameters to allow Lufthansa to implement its strategy. This
department’s function (in this context) brought in non-market information and analysis
into the company and then they moderated their decision-making processes to react to
potential policies, while defending their positions. In other words, this department took
its non-market decisions post 9/11 and then tried to the influence the policy environment
in order to facilitate the implementation of their own corporate strategy. They worked on
the local level, with the hub communities, European commission and other European
governments.
On the other hand, pre 9/11 this office focused their efforts on many different
issues. According to the interviews and annual reports, we found that this department
focused large amounts of time on slot regulation, labor laws, and improving the image of
Lufthansa with regards to the environment. In addition, they were working in different
jurisdictions to gain traffic rights e.g. from Japan to the U.S. At an abstract and peripheral
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level they focused mainly on monitoring and defending their organization’s position by
scanning the non-market environment. As one respondent said:
The main issues were mainly very dull. Of course the infrastructure scarcity was
already an issue. So issues like slot regulation and environment. Single European
Sky was already on the list. Galileo was another issue that was talked about. Then
all kinds of labor law issues or operational regulations. IATA sounding for
example safety issues. And then of course we spent a lot of time on forging
alliances and getting the respecting clearances for that. Then noise issues. The
hushkit debate. Subsidies questions. Ailtalia two packages I guess. Many airlines
were earning quite good money in the industry so the whole thing was not as
critical and as adventurous as it was post 9/11.
Political capabilities were required by the Lufthansa’s government affairs office while
they employed lobbying actions to influence various stakeholders. As one senior
respondent describes the lobbying routines used in this context:
These routines were the same as the ones used in other issues but in greater
frequency and different combinations. The routines were used to influence our
governments and EU level political actors. This was an extraordinary event so we
used a mix of routines that we believed would create positive influence. These
combinations are not a strict recipe but more dependent on our owners in mind.
While another senior respondent said:
To be more precise, let us look at things step by step. We were first evaluating
what had occurred. Thereafter we used the phone calls to see who could help. So I
had to look to see who could help us. Undeniably friends and alliances within the
system are very important to this process. We used routines revolved around
personal letters to the commission, phone calls to people in the commission but
these routines are givens. However, what is important are the people that are most
close to you within the system. These people can influence to some degree. But I
would say that the combinations are important. Indirect routes cannot happen
without direct routes.
Our findings indicate that Lufthansa was using some lobbying routines to influence
policy makers after 9/11 using an a combination of high frequency telephone routines,
visiting friends, letters and one to one sessions with political contacts. The generic
lobbying routines included AEA and holding talks at conferences. The generic lobbying
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routines were viewed to be the best way to influence political actors in their opinions
after a few weeks; therefore they focused most of their efforts on coalition representation,
instead of using mainly individual efforts.
Prior to 9/11, the government affairs office had freedom to lobby without having
meetings with its CEO or other directors, as most of its senior representatives in this
office were empowered to make important decisions with regards to lobbying. However,
after 9/11, the direction and lobbying efforts had to change for the government affairs
office because Lufthansa had to defend its declining position. Moreover, Lufthansa did
not drastically change its approach to running its government affairs department nor did it
restructure the department. It just shifted its focus to its coalition lobbying arm after
lobbying individually. As one Senior Lufthansa figure highlights:
Lobbying had to change at Lufthansa in the sense of whom to contact, which
manner to contact and of course content. Also the flow of decision shifted from
bottom up to top down. The individual routines were at the start similar to other
contexts but used more frequently but then we used AEA more. [A002]
In this policy context, political resources were very important in developing Lufthansa’s
lobbying capability. Senior management believed that their lobbying capability
development process would start from their political resource base. Consequently, they
would use their thinking blueprints to weigh the options of whether introducing new
political resources or use current ones, to make new lobbying processes or use current
ones, in order to leverage and deploy the political resources to create favorable policy
changes. Lufthansa’s respondents disclosed that their thinking templates led them to
believe that political resources were comprised of human, organizational, structural
resources and network resources. They believed that some sub-level political resources
needed to be reconfigured to create non-market change to impact on the potential onset of
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new polices.
The senior management team believed that their previous experiences, foresight,
current learning, ownership and time played important roles in configuring their political
resources to develop their lobbying capability in order to effectively leverage and deploy
their political resources again. One of the respondents believed that it was important to
get involved in the lobbying process early rather than late and that talking to high status
people was initially the right way in this context:
I think, like all airlines we were conveying our position to our authorities in the
hours after 9/11. We did this for weeks using individual and AEA paths. We
contacted people at both national and EU level. We tried to work with the
European Commission. But it is always a very delicate game to balance your
lobbying at Brussels and on a national front. You need support from your own
member state and the council usually if you want anything done at Brussels. You
don’t just lobby just at Brussels, but you have to lobby at Berlin and Bohn. You
have to balance between the all things in my view.
Case Study 3: Alitalia
The government affairs function within Alitalia was organized to deal with institutional
organizations; it dealt with the legal frameworks, however it had developed a more
business-oriented approach since the deregulation period. Within this office, there were
mainly senior people that were responsible for dealing with the key stakeholders. That
covered all relations with institutions at national and EU level. At the national level, it
was primarily dealing with the Italian parliament and the Italian government and it’s
Ministry of Transport. It also dealt with the treasury, as the treasury held about 62% of
the capital of Alitalia (the main shareholder). They also had relations with the Italian
regions, as Italian regions had a lot of power and the Vatican. At the EU level, it would
have dialogue with the Commission, parliament and Council. Pre 9/11 this office focused
their efforts on many issues, but getting a decree from the Italian government to authorize
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privatization was one of the most important. Nevertheless, others efforts included
lobbying for traffic to South America, labor law, and improving the tarnished state-
owned image. At an abstract and peripheral level they focused mainly on monitoring and
defending their organization’s position by scanning the non-market environment. As one
respondent said:
Alitalia was focusing on getting a decree from the Italian government to authorize
the privatization of the company, because at the time Alitalia was developing its
links with Air France. The company had just joined sky team…And the company
was very much focused on lobbying at a national level to get that privatization. At
EU level, before 11 September, the company was focused on using AEA to lobby.
But there was no specific issue of importance except that the company wanted
and knew that it would have to be recapitalized somewhere in 2002. And of
course this recapitalization would be undertaken partly by the state, being the
main shareholder. And it would have to get approval from the commission. So it
was preparing that.
However, post 9/11, Alitalia was focusing on lobbying for three issues. During the
exogenous policy context (2001-2005), this department made decisions to influence the
policy environment in order to facilitate the implementation of their own corporate
strategy to defend its position. They worked on the local level, with the hub communities,
European Commission and other European governments. As respondent said:
The triple issues that everyone was lobbying for: the compensation package, the
insurance cover issue and the security cost issue. We were lobbying for those
issues, but I would put the security cost as the last issue because the priority was
on compensation for the four days of closure of US Air space just after 11
September and on insurance. Because without insurance we would not be able to
simply operate and then of course the reimbursement of security cost of having
the states accept taking on those costs. For Alitalia there was a specific issue,
which overcame all those issues. It is the fact that we were lobbying to get our
new restructuring plan and the recapitalization of the company approved by
Brussels and that is what we obtained in June 2002…So in that period a lot of
lobbying was done. I was almost in Brussels non-stop.
Post 9/11, Alitalia asked the Italian Government for financial support to cover payments
for staff redundancies through the cancellation of the 10 per cent ticket tax. This was in
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addition to the airline’s receipt of the third and final financial aid agreed by the European
Commission in October 2001, on a “one-time, last-time” basis and subject to various
conditions. Alitalia believed that US governments put in place a $15 billion dollar
package which needed to be equaled in Europe. Moreover, the US received around five
billion in cash and ten billion in loans for US carriers and so it was clear that Alitalia had
to react along similar lines. However, they knew that it was going to be very difficult
from the start, where the European government and commission offices considered not
meeting a comparable US financial size. The evaluation of options led them to believe
that investing time and people in following the process was not really worth it, so they
shifted all efforts to AEA. The message in Brussels was, “yes we understand but air
transportation is in trouble, but if you cannot survive this then too bad as we don’t have
too much money”. As a result, Alitalia realized their lobbying capability development
process had to measure the best efficiency path and time for this type of context.
The choice and combination of lobbying activities can be very important in
creating a type of ‘defense’ influence to protect balance sheets from being eroded. This
was the case for most airlines post 9/11, where airlines were going to face the exogenous
policies that would hinder their competitive positions. Alitalia’s government affairs office
were using different lobbying routine combinations in order to leverage and deploy
political resources to influence policy makers for the three policy issues, those being
insurance coverage, airline security cost issue and a compensation package. They started
using a combination of activities such as: using an array of high frequency telephone
routines, visiting friends, writing letters and one to one sessions with political contacts.
They also focused most of their efforts on coalition representation (using AEA) after a
few weeks instead of using mainly individual efforts. A senior manager said:
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Alitalia was hit badly by the terrorist attacks. We evaluated the damage and the
future damages that would be incurred. As a result, we started asking the Italian
Government for help to cover payments for staff redundancies we made, because
of the cancellation of the tickets etc. We used several routes to pass information to
our authorities about our declining positions. We used direct contacts, had
meetings and phone calls with the treasury, which was not that successful in my
view. But yes, I believe that AEA was the most important way to get our message
heard.
Prior to 9/11, the government affairs office did not develop a sophisticated European
lobbying arm as they did not have to go far to speak to their national government.
However, after 9/11, the direction and political efforts had to change for the government
affairs office because Alitalia had to defend its declining position. They did change
drastically their approach to running their government affairs department and restructured
the department. As one Senior Alitalia figure highlights:
We did what we could by writing letters, talking to our friends, our owners. But in
the end, we had to use AEA. Time was a big factor and we had to react quickly in
order to utilize the right processes but we had limited resources.
While another respondent said:
I can tell you that we increased our activities, writing, making phone calls,
emailing, and so on. But we have not have a clean template like maybe British
airways that focus in creating a particular type of routine groups, if that is what
you like to call it. I think we were messy, probably because of the fact that we are
so much less number of people after 9/11, and therefore it was difficult for us to
organize our work and we were busy with issues.
In this context, political capabilities were seen as very important by Alitalia’s top
management team to help developing Alitalia’s lobbying capability. Senior management
believed that their lobbying capability development process would start from their
political resource base. Alitalia’s respondents clarified that their thinking processes were
well defined but constrained by time and ownership. However, following a blueprint led
them to believe that political resources, human, organizational, structural, and network
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resources, could be used to develop their political capability. They believed that some
sub-level political resources were needed to be organized in such a way as to create non-
market defense to reduce the potential onset of new exogenous polices. Yet the emergent
policies were considered difficult to control in Alitalia view. As one respondent said:
We did what we could by writing letters, talking to our friends, our owners. But in
the end, we had to use AEA for the three issues as time was running out. While
we used individual lobbying for the recapitalization as that was the most
important thing in my view… We had the expertise at the national level but could
not lobby at the EU level the same way, as we did not have the right resources for
this time.
Case Study 4: SAS Airlines
The government affairs function within SAS was organized to deal with legal
frameworks, bilateral agreements with states, monitoring of the political landscape and,
more importantly, implementing corporate political strategies to create or defend their
competitive position. The senior people within this office were responsible for dealings
with the key stakeholders, which covered all relations with institutions at national and EU
level. National level was primarily the Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish parliaments and
governments.
Pre 9/11 this office focused their efforts on many issues including acquisition of
traffic rights and monitoring the political scene. In other words, at an abstract level they
focused mainly on monitoring by scanning the non-market environment. Soon after 9/11
(exogenous policy context), this department took decisions to defend their position from
the emerging policy environment in order to facilitate the implementation of their own
corporate strategy. They worked on the local level, with the hub communities, and at an
international level with the European Commission and other European governments to
protect their position. They made it clear that SAS was in a difficult position; stopping
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insurance, not providing compensation, and making them pay for security costs would be
disastrous for the Scandinavian region. As one respondent said:
Acquisition of traffic rights and mainly monitoring the political scene were the
activities that our departments were focusing their efforts on. But on the actual
day of the attack I was in Brussels actually. At that point I thought that the airline
industry will never be the same after and of course that was true. September 11
had a tremendous impact on the entire airline industry. But looking at 9/11 as an
impact in context of this department and its functions, it did not change anything
drastically in our department. It was just that we had some new topics that we had
to deal with like security, like insurance and those kinds of things. But what we
did before 9/11 and after 9/11 on general routines bases was not very different.
While another SAS informant said:
We expressed our views on insurance and security costs. Those were big things,
so we were lobbying the EU system mostly through AEA but we also obviously
used our national EU representatives also. We addressed the Scandinavian
governments and parliaments. That was vital - without that state insurance help, I
don’t think that any airline would have survived. And the Airlines paying all the
security costs would have been problematic.
SAS realized their political capability development process had to measure the best
efficiency path and time for this type of context. They started lobbying various
stakeholders using different political actions but maintained a similar structure to pre
9/11. However, their decision frames were based on following other people and using
their own rules.
Everyone has different network base but we all use a generic platform like AEA.
But the network is differentiated by who you know. I think individual lobbying
has its perks and some contexts need this more, while coalition lobbying using
trade associations have their benefits too in some contexts. Maybe using both
individual and group lobbying is the best way forward. I think overall that we
managed to get what we wanted at EU level and collectively with the other
airlines, with AEA…Of course you needed all these issues to be approved at EU
level but as far as implementation was concerned, it all depended on national
level, so then you needed to go to your respective member states and make sure
that they would take the implementing decisions because it was there economic
value that was getting affected.
There were lots of different political actions found to be used by the SAS’s government
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affairs office during this new institutional environment. As one senior respondent
describes the choice of lobbying routines:
Well we used phone calls, letters and personal visits to meet some people at our
national authorities in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. But AEA was doing most
of the work for us when it came to lobbying the European commission. They
provided the coordination and information gathering, intelligence exchange and
so forth.
While another senior respondent said:
The process was very much like what it has been traditionally using the various
routines and tools within our box, including letters and information material,
including meetings, one to one or with larger groups. But at this point we had a
time element as well, so intensity of lobbying had to change. So it would be fair to
say that we had less time with direct contact with politicians to influence them in
the way we wanted. Less time talking to all the different political parties and
governments of the three Scandinavian countries. They understood the problems
quite fast. They had no problem there and they all talked to each other to be sure
that they were handling the matter the same way.
SAS was using particular lobbying actions to influence policy makers after 9/11: high
intensity telephone routines, visiting friends, letters and one to one sessions with political
contacts. The generic lobbying routines included mainly AEA and attending conferences.
Prior to 9/11, the government affairs office had freedom to lobby without having
meetings with its CEO or other directors; this was the case as most of its senior
representatives in this office were empowered to make important decisions with regards
to lobbying. However, after 9/11, the direction and lobbying efforts had to change for the
government affairs office because SAS had to defend its declining position. Moreover,
SAS did not change drastically its approach to running its government affairs department
nor did it restructure the department. It just shifted its focus to its coalition lobbying arm.
SAS respondents disclosed that their thinking templates led them to believe that
their political resources, human, organizational, structural, and network resources, needed
to be used to defend their position from the institutional environment. Moreover, the
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senior management team believed that their previous experiences, foresight, current
learning, and autonomous factors of ownership and time played important roles in
configuring their political resources to develop their lobbying capability, in order to
effectively leverage and deploy their political resources again (resource->capability-
>resource). The respondents believed that it was important to get involved in lobbying
activities earlier rather than later. In this context, they realized that time was an issue,
therefore talking to high status authorities early and using AEA was the right way to
lobby. As this respondent says:
Yes, I agree with you completely. Nobody could in Europe wait. It was about
getting together quickly. The national governments were the ones to provide the
guarantees. In this time, European structures were superfluous where national
relations were extremely important. Because when things happen so fast there was
simply no time to do anything on a consorted level. There was a development
very quickly. It was called EURO time at ICAO.
Case Study 5: TAP Air
The government affairs function within TAP air was organized to deal with the political
environment and the legal frameworks. This office contained people that were
responsible for communication with the key stakeholders. These forms of
communications constituted formal and informal information exchanges at national and
international levels with political actors; sustaining and building relations with
institutions, airlines and political actors at both national and international level; and
monitoring the political landscape. At the national level it primarily had contact with the
Portuguese parliament and the Portuguese government. Contact with the national
government was mainly with the Ministry of Transport and with the treasury. At the EU
level they had contact with the commission, parliament and council. As one respondent
said:
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I deal with government affairs and our department deals with government affairs,
multi-lateral representation, and aeropolitical affairs and also alliances. So it is
external affairs and alliances where we have to keep our networks fresh and alive.
By alliances it does not mean on the alliance in which we are integrated in but
also all the commercial arrangements that we have with other non-alliance
partners.
Pre 9/11 this office focused its efforts on issues such as route development to places like
Brazil and Venezuela. At an abstract and peripheral level they focused mainly on
monitoring and creating new opportunities by scanning the non-market environment. As
one respondent said:
I made it clear that it was all about the search of commercial opportunities. It was
very much about our office lobbying our civil aviation authority in order to make
sure they would allow us to grow here or there and so forth. This has been very
much the main stream of effort before 9/11…The revenue enhancement side then
on the cost reduction side, so that was probably the big difference, if you compare
the period before and the period after.
However, during this exogenous policy context (2001-2005), this department took
decisions to influence the policy environment in order to facilitate the implementation of
their own corporate strategy. Their strategic behavior started more at a local level, with
them touching base with contacts at the European Commission. With further evaluation
of the different options, they decided not to invest too much time and resources on their
individual lobbying processes. As a result, they shifted all efforts to AEA to do the
lobbying. As a respondent said:
On the security measures issues, we mimicked or processed on what other airlines
did, so when one member state does something, other member states do the same.
So one starts the chain reaction. For instance cockpit doors, and that sort of
things, there was coverage for that type of cost. But for the main cost incurred,
there was no consensus. Again it is an issue of how many member states are
willing to step into resolving a certain issue. More and more member states look
at each other. They do not do anything without looking at each other, for instance
Portugal will look at France or UK etc. So it very much depends on how strong
you lobby with the national government...Of course, we also used an association
called AEA. I believe, in this particular time, we used them a lot. With AEA, we
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always exchanged views, and tried to have all our peers as active as everyone
else, as it is the only way.
TAP realized their political capability development process had to measure the best
efficiency path for this type of context. The choice was determined by the facts that there
was a short timeframe and most other airlines had similar interests. TAP Air’s
government affairs office was using different lobbying routines in order to leverage and
deploy political resources to influence policy makers for the three policy issues:
insurance coverage, airline security cost issue and compensation package. They started
using a combination of lobbying practices such as: high frequency telephone routines,
visiting friends, writing letters and one to one sessions with political contacts. They
focused most of their efforts on coalition representation (using AEA) after a few weeks
instead of using mainly individual efforts. A senior manager said:
We used mainly personal contacts at the start. This choice was based on the fact
that our previous experience showed personal routes are important at the start.
The email is very impersonal and people read it or don’t read it. If you send a
letter that is one page, people get bored and they do not have time, they probably
put it somewhere on their desk and let it sit there for two months. I do! It was very
much our principal that as much as possible, we needed face to face meetings
after 9/11, where we explained what we needed. Being a state-owned airline,
people listen to at home. As much as we can that is how we worked. In other
words, direct methods… But then AEA was also used to make our position more
transparent… we did after 2003 restructure and lay off some people.
Prior to 9/11, the government affairs office did not develop a sophisticated European
lobbying arm as they did not have to go far to speak to their national government.
However, after 9/11, the direction and lobbying efforts had to change for the government
affairs office at TAP, because they had to defend their declining position. Moreover, they
drastically changed their strategic behavior in running their government affairs
department and hence restructured the department. As a result, it shifted its focus to its
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coalition lobbying arm. As one Senior TAP figure highlights:
We are not sitting here and waiting for our civil aviation authority or external
relations department of Ministry of Transportation…So for me in order for the
lobbying to be as effective as possible, you need to start your intervention very
early in the process, as soon as it happens, we immediately create an internal
questionnaire and discussion to create the broad lines of TAP’s position on this or
that issue. We discuss it with our CEO or the member of the board then we start
shooting, we usually do it to the Ministry of Transportation, to the civil aviation
authority, to the permanent representative of Portugal in Brussels. Sometimes
directly with the transport committee of the European Parliament or even the
Commission. And then of course we give our knowledge to AEA and IATA, so
that they know what we are doing. So this is very much the process.
During the interviews, TAP’s senior management explained that thinking processes were
well-defined, but constrained by time. However, following a blueprint led them to believe
that political resources, human, organizational structural and network resources could be
used to develop their lobbying capability. They believed that some sub-level political
resources were needed for their lobbying to reduce the potential onset of negative polices
for airlines. As one respondent said:
We had the people with some good knowledge in place to deal with the rising
issues from 9/11. But you need more time to influence at the EU level. Maybe our
structure and competence was more national oriented then EU level, which we
tried to fix around 2004. But using AEA was another avenue to follow after 9/11,
as they had the resources and competencies.
Case Study Comparison
Following our case-by-case analysis of the political actions (mainly lobbying activities)
employed within each of our five case studies, we focused our attention on developing a
deeper understanding of how the political capabilities employed within each airline came
to be developed on the aftermath of 9/11. We developed a political capability
development path for each firm based on our interviews and archival data. We then
compared and contrasted these paths to see whether there were similarities across the five
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cases. We found that broadly the five case airlines had followed five key steps in their
political capability development process. These were: 1. Designing Political Capabilities,
2. Changing Context, 3. Shaping Induced Political Strategy, 4. Shaping Autonomous
Political Strategy, 5. Choosing Resources and Routines, 6. Shaping back the
Environment. Table 3 below captures these six stages of our process model and provides
additional evidence to support the presence of each stage. Table 4 summarizes and
provides a comparison of the features of political capability development across the five
case studies. Next we show how these results can help us build a more nuanced
theoretical understanding of the political capability development process.
---------------------------------
Insert Table 3 about here
---------------------------------
---------------------------------
Insert Table 4 about here
---------------------------------
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Towards a Model of Political Capability Development
Our research identified a range of organizational variables that the airlines were
expectedly seeking to change or change as a result of this reactive institutional context, as
illustrated in Figure 2. Making these changes was mainly viewed not as overcoming
inertia or commitment to an existing path of political capability development, but rather
as a need for a different realignment to the institutional context in order to reach what
several informants termed “the following stage of the institutional context” of the security
policy issue. In other words, not all airlines were purposely seeking to create an effective
‘political capability’ from the time when they came across the institutional context, but
rather it was about lobbying to reach the next stage of obtaining the “positive decisions
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from within the political system”. Nevertheless, the decisions were taken by the senior
managers in order to defend against the potential security policy and its impact on the
potential performance.
---------------------------------
Insert Figure 2 about here
---------------------------------
Figure 2 shows the central tenets of capability theory and the role of management
commitment in shaping the development and application of political capabilities in a
reactive institutional context. We conceptualized the interplay between the senior
management’s strategic decision making and the policy environment as a type of cycle.
The systematic order from 1-6 depicts the underlining logic from the strategic choice to
reacting to the emerging policy environment (e), where the organization has to shift from
previous institutional environment (E) to the new institutional environment (E). At stage
1, the senior management teams are dealing with the day to day activity of a specific
policy environment at international and national level. At this stage they choose a specific
political strategy or use an existing one to meet the new emerging policy context (stage 1
and 2 are closely linked). At stage 2, the management come across an emerging policy
context, whether a high uncertainty or low uncertainty on the policy type. At stage 3, the
senior management introduces a strategy for influencing policymaking, where they
decide how to deploy, leverage or reconfigure their specific political resources to either
defend or create political advantage. However, stage 3 ties in with stage 4, where the
senior management comes across autonomous (emergent) effects on the political strategy,
either due to time-frame or ownership structure, which act as a constraint mechanism to
political capability development, causing the path to be pre-determined in some way and
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offering little flexibility i.e. as found in state-owned airlines. At stage 5, the senior
management have to decide how to configure their political resource base, in order to use
generic or idiosyncratic political capabilities to influence. At stage 6, they must react to
the new dominant policy context (E). Having presented the model of political capability
development, we next discuss our theoretical and empirical contributions.
Theoretical Contributions and Managerial Insights
In our theoretical discussion we suggested that political resources, institutional features
and institutional levels could be perceived as a strong constraint or facilitator in the
transferability of micro sources during the development of political capabilities. As we
showed, most prior research on capabilities has emphasized the constraining effect of
organizational history, organizational learning, technological trajectories, evolutionary
paths created by organizational routines, and resources or decision-making taken by top
managers which tend towards inertia (Ethiraj et al. 2005; Teece et al. 1997; Tripsas and
Gavetti 2000;). Our findings contribute to these studies by revealing: a) the distinctive
stages of political capability development and b) the way the institutional context can
impact on the political capability development process.
The findings of our study also address many of the theoretical limitations of the
capability theory (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Ethiraj et al. 2005; Priem and Butler
2002;), while also extending and elaborating the theory of capabilities to connect it to
institutional effects, and simultaneously building in a behavioral dimension by applying a
theory of strategic decision making that operates on several levels of analysis. We
attempt to identify each phase in the process model which was deduced from extensive
research, which assessed the business and political capability profiles of five case
organizations: two state-owned airlines (TAP Air Portugal and Alitalia) and three
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privately owned airlines (SAS, Lufthansa and KLM).
When we compared the state-owned airlines with privately owned airlines in this
institutional context, in which we found diverging styles in the development of political
capabilities. Moreover, we found that there was a general pattern in place, where state-
owned airlines were investing less effort into their political capability development in this
context. Similar to Carpenter and Fredrickson (2001), we found that organizations
reacted similarly to their given institutional context. However, we also found that state-
owned airlines illustrated some similar behavior as privately owned airlines. However,
our findings demonstrate that state-owned airlines experienced more constraints within
their institutional context despite following similar processes, which had an impact in
their political capability development process. We argue that this difference can attribute
to the fact that there was no separation of control and ownership, which did not align the
principle and agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). The interests and incentives were different, which
caused some inefficiency on the investment of effort. Our findings also provide empirical
backing for the argument that “a practice perspective can shed light on the way
capabilities emerge, are developed, modified and changed over time, furthering our
understanding of the essence of dynamic capabilities” (Jarzabkowski, 2005:7). More
specifically, we find that micro-level political processes are related to the particular
nuances of the institutional contexts firms operate in. Therefore, in reactive institutional
contexts, we have networking and human capital practices, which are either generic or
idiosyncratic.
In conclusion, our study of the airline industry in the aftermath of 9/11 has sought
to build a bridge between organizational capability theory and institutional theory, in
order to identify the antecedent micro–level processes that play a role in developing a
35
political capability in a given reactive institutional context. We argue that the effective
development of corporate political capabilities to influence political actors by top
management teams within European flag carrier airlines depends on a number of complex
and overlapping variables between the institutional and organizational levels. We found
that management decisions are core to this development process, within which the senior
manager have to decide on the level of time investment that his or her department has to
make in network relationships to influence political actors. Taken together, our
theoretical and practical insights offer a new glimpse into the ways political capabilities
are developed in firms that face emergent institutional pressures.
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Table 1: Perspectives on the study of political capabilities in emergent institutional contexts
Institutional View Resource-based View Strategy-as-Practice
Perspective
Principal
Questions
 How do firms and
industries deal with
emergent institutional
contexts?
 What are the resources that a
firm needs to develop political
capabilities in emergent
institutional contexts? How can
these resources be developed?
 What are the political capabilities
required by managers when
dealing with emergent
institutional contexts? How are
political capabilities developed
and reconfigured by
practitioners?
Theoretical
Aims
 To theorize about the ways
firms and relations amongst
firms change in the context
of emergent institutional
contexts
 To theorize about the role of
firm resources for the firm’s
ability to deal with emergent
institutional contexts
 To theorize about the particular
forms of acting and the on-going
processes through which actors
develop political capabilities
Key
Constructs
 Incumbency/inertia  Preexisting firm resources
 Resource gaps
 Lobbying capabilities
 Practice breakdowns
Methods  Mainly quantitative
approaches and some
limited use of qualitative
methods
 Mainly quantitative approaches
and some limited use of
qualitative methods
 Qualitative and ethnographical
/action-based approaches
Theoretical
Foundations
 Powell and DiMaggio,
1991; North, 1990.
 Peteraf, 1993; Tripsas and
Gavetti 2000; Ethiraj et al. 2005
 Feldman and Orlikowski (2011),
Sandberg and Tsoukas (2011)
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Table 2: The five case study airlines
Airlines Ownership Number of
employees
Country of
origin
SAS* 21.4% Swedish State
14.3% Danish State
14.3% Norwegian State
50% Private interests
13,528 Norway
Sweden
Denmark
Alitalia 62.4% State ownership
35.7% Private ownership
2% Air France
20,575 Italy
TAP Air
Portugal
100% State ownership 5,750 Portugal
Lufthansa* 91.4% Free Float
8.6% Block Ownership
90,673 Germany
KLM* 100% Public quoted company (2001)
96% KLM/Air France (2004)
37,487 Netherlands
* Majority public quoted
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Table 3: The six stages in the development of political capability in a reactive institutional context
Stages Interview Extract Strength of
Evidence
(***: Strong, **:
Moderate, *:Weak)
1. Designing
Capabilities
We were lobbying the EU system mostly through AEA but we also obviously
used our national EU representatives. We addressed the Scandinavian
governments and parliaments for the compensation package. We had to start by
thinking about the tactics to influence various stakeholders.
***
To make sure people hear you, you must contact your top trumps quickly, then
start contacting other friends at other airlines and the AEA.
***
We kept everything in-house, as that is the best way to keep control on outcomes.
Yes, everything was done in-house, so that we could save money. Hiring
consultants is far too expensive and we need to keep the influence knowledge in
house
***
2. Changing
Context
At this time we needed to be effective, efficient and more serious about lobbying.
Influence on the political decision making process cannot be made from a
distance. You have to be there, physically present in the Brussels environment.
That is a structure we introduced before 9/11 - in 2000. Therefore, there was no
real change in our structure.
***
I think you could say that in this context building new networks was not
important because we already had the old networks and time was knocking on
our door. In general, I would say the first most important thing we used would be
the current network from our people. The second thing is that our organization
has a strong reputation, so this helps to build up such a network and keep your
network healthy. Of course the contact maker has to be well connected and
articulate in relaying the information.
***
The contacts cannot be born overnight. It’s more complex in our lobbying design. **
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For example in our department after September 11 we had few people from
different fields of knowledge. We had thinkers - which is important - and then
contactors. At least that is how we worked then and still work.
3. Shaping
Induced
Political
Strategy
We did not change our structure. We remained structurally intact with no
modifications. Like I said earlier. This department is very specialized and each
person plays a very important role. Lufthansa can be weakened if any of them are
taken out of the big picture. Yes other departments did lose people, like in
marketing, but our function is viewed as a very important function.
***
Well, post-9/11, we built it both ways. We like to form them naturally and by
actually targeting specific people we know that might help us in achieving what
we want. We were contacting all the people that we knew had power to get the
insurance issue, aviation cost issue and compensation package issue resolved
without affecting our revenue. You could argue it was induced by us.
***
Post-9/11 meant that we had to react quickly, as time meant less money and
potential future problems. Having to react quickly meant that we had no time to
recruit new people, and in actual fact it did not make sense hiring new people in
this time for us.
***
What we have done is we have slightly restructured in such a way that we were
getting smaller in number slowly after 9/11. My department is now just four
while there were five other people in the same area in 2001.
***
4. Shaping
Autonomous
Political
Strategy
Being a state airline means obviously that we can talk to the national
government. The ownership plays a big role in deciding how to lobby. In our
case because we are a government-owned company, we don’t have to lobby the
same ways as British Airways or KLM. We spoke directly to the government, but
mainly used AEA due to time factor in this context.
***
We had people with some good knowledge in place to deal with the issues arising
from 9/11. But you need more time to influence at the EU level. Maybe our
structure and competence was more nationally oriented then EU level, which we
tried to fix around 2004 by hiring new people.
***
5. Choosing We re-shaped in early 2002 and did the main restructuring around 2003. But we
definitely re-enforced our lobbying activities because of all the consequences of
**
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Resources and
Routines
the 9/11 attacks.
We used direct contacts, had meetings and phone calls with the treasury, which
was not that successful in my view. But yes, I believe that AEA was the most
important way to get our message heard.
***
I think we were slightly limited in who we could talk to being government-
owned. But this can be good, as you can well imagine, being owned by the
government means you can organize meetings quickly with important people to
inform them about your position. This means we can be heard in Europe quickly.
As we all know there are good things and bad things to being owned by a state.
***
6. Shaping back
the
Environment
We realized that we needed new people who had better EU knowledge, as that is
where things were moving.
**
People are important and we think that 9/11 hit us hard. We had to lobby using
various routines like meetings, communicating using our phones and face to face,
but our people were less EU focused. Therefore AEA became a very important
channel for us to have our voice heard.
**
Oh yes, it became even more crucial to restructure our department after 9/11.
Actually that is when they hired me. They changed a bit the profile of the director
for that position in the sense that before the person that was in charge had a more
national background. After September 11, I was recruited because our firm
wanted someone that had more of an EU background.
**
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Table 4: Comparing the five case studies in terms of their political capability development processes
KLM Lufthansa Alitalia SAS TAP Air
Approach to
developing
political
capability
development
Directive,
Top-down
Reactive
Directive,
Top-down
Reactive
Directive,
Top-down
Reactive
Directive,
Top-down
Reactive
Non-directive,
Bottom up
Proactive
Organizational
structure
investment
Modified early
(pre-deregulation)
Modified early
(pre-deregulation)
Modified late
(After second
package)
Modified early
(pre-deregulation)
Modified late
(After second
package)
Network
investment
Modified early
(pre-deregulation)
Sequence order
from national to
international
political targets
Modified early
(pre-deregulation)
Sequence order
from national to
international
political targets
Modified late
(After second
package)
Sequence order
from national to
international
political targets
Modified early
(pre-deregulation)
Sequence order
from national to
international
political targets
Modified early
(After first
package)
Sequence
order from
national to
international
political
targets
Competencies
investment
In-house
competence not
modified.
In-house
competence not
modified.
Modified early.
In-house
competence
modified and
In-house
competence not
modified.
Modified early.
In-house
competence
modified and
AEA
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However,
modified
competence by
shifting focus to
AEA
However,
modified
competence by
shifting focus to
AEA
AEA
competence
introduced
However,
modified
competence by
shifting focus to
AEA
competence
introduced
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Figure 1: The national and international-level stakeholders of the five case study
airlines
The European government
itself, in the form of:
 The Economic and
Social Committee
 The Joint Committee
 The European
Commission,
 European Parliament,
 The Committee for
Transport and
Tourism;
 The Council
Ministries
 Transport;
 Finance;
 Foreign Affairs;
 Parliament
Government advisory
bodies and industries, such
as the:
 Social and Economic
Council
 Provisional Council for
Transport
 Airport officials
Government advisory
bodies, such as:
 The Economic and
social Committee
 The Joint Committee
Government Affairs
Office
Marketing
HR & Operations
CEO & TMT
Firm levelNational level International level
Industries and organizations
such as:
 Association of
European Airlines;
 IATA
 European Civil Aviation
conference
 European Regional and
Charter Airlines
Insurance bodies
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Figure 2: Capability Development Process in the context of a reactive institutional
environment
Choosing the
political capabilities
design
Context change
(emerging proactive or
reactive institutional
context)
Induced corporate
political strategy
Autonomous
(emergent) effects on
the corporate political
strategy
Choice to use
internal or/and
external political
resources and
routines
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